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Factors
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past three years, merger and acquisition activity in the
United States and abroad has been at record levels Nowhere has
this been more prevalent than in the banking industry. In 1997, more
than $375 billion in bank and thrift assets were acquired in over 350
banking mergers.' North Carolina banks have played a major role in
this merger trend. Four of the ten largest mergers in 1997 included
North Carolina banks. Additionally, NationsBank and First Union,
both North Carolina banks, were recently involved in the two largest
bank mergers in history Experts contend this trend will continue
into 1998 as banks try to establish economies of scales in order to
compete in the global financial market and try to achieve stability in
order to deal with the uncertainty of bank technology after the year
2000.'
With bank merger activity at an all-time high, bank merger
antitrust guidelines and the effects of mergers on market competition
have become increasingly important issues to banks and consumers
alike. Generally, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
(Board) uses the Herfmdahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to evaluate the
effects of mergers on competition and to measure post-merger
market concentrations.' However, there has been some debate during
1. See Steven Lipin, Murphy's Law Doesn't Apply: The Conditions are Perfect for
Continued Growth in Mergers, WALL. ST. J., Jan. 2, 1998, at R6.
2. See In the Financial Services Business, the Prevailing Wisdom is that Bigger is
Better, FORBES, Jan. 12, 1998, at 152.
3. See Top 150 Bank and Thrift Acquisitions Announced in 1997, AM. BANKER, Jan.
29, 1998 at 4A.
4. See Bank M&A Seen Reaching Record in 1998, CFO ALERT 1, Jan. 19, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 5283066. But see Tania Padgett, Community Bank Deals Expected
to Slow This Year, AM. BANKER, Jan. 29, 1998 at 3A (stating that mergers and acquisitions
of community banks are expected to slow dramatically in 1998). See generally David S.
Greaves, Comment, Banks and the Year 2000 Problem, 2 N.C. BANKING INST. 390 (1998)
(discussing the problems associated with the year 2000 problem in the banking industry).
5. The HHI is a federal merger guideline used to evaluate post-merger market
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the last year as to whether the Board actually uses the HHI standards
of review and whether those standards actually serve as an
impediment to proposed bank mergers that do not fall within its
parameters.
In the last two years, the Board approved thirty-one merger
applications6  that substantially exceeded the federal merger
guidelines set by the HHI (Merger Guidelines).7 Additionally, in
1997, the Board suggested that bank mergers might actually fall
under a more relaxed standard than the one established by the HHI
and would face "clear sailing" through the review process even if
they exceeded Merger Guidelines.' These representations combined
with the large number of mergers approved during 1996-97 that
exceeded the Merger Guidelines seemed to confirm what most
attorneys suspected, that the Board used a more relaxed standard to
review bank mergers and that gaining approval for mergers that
exceeded the current standard was not a difficult task.
However, during the last half of 1997, the Board sent out
several signals that in the future it might not be as receptive to
merger applications that excessively push guideline limits. The
Board's first signal came in June when Southern National proposed
merging with United Carolina Bancshares Corporation. 9 In that
proposal, the Board approved the merger with a rare 3-2 split with
concentration of banking resources. In bank mergers, an 1800/200 HHI ratio has been
established as a safe harbor. See JOSEPH ANGLAND ET" AL., ANTrrRuST LAW DEVELOPMENTS
1238 (4th ed. 1997). The Board generally does not challenge mergers that have post-
merger market concentration levels below this ratio. See id. Merger proposals with markets
where the concentration levels exceed this ratio can still be approved if the acquiring bank
can show the presence of mitigating factors that reduce the anticompetitive effects of the
merger in the non-complying markets or can use divestitures to bring the post-merger HHI
ratios in those markets within the safe harbor. See infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text
(discussing the HHI in detail).
6. This Comment will use the words application(s) and proposal(s) interchangeably.
7. See infra notes 47, 50 and accompanying text. This Comment will use Merger
Guidelines as a reference to the 1800/200 HHI standard for market concentration used by
the Board when evaluating bank mergers. Also, this Comment will use the phrases Merger
Guidelines and HHI Merger Guidelines interchangeably.
8. R. Christian Bruce, Mergers and Acquisitions: Fed Likely To Ease Bank Mergers
By Using Relaxed Screening Criteria, 68 Banking Rep. (BNA) 712 (Apr. 14, 1997). In
April 1997, Stephen Roades, Chief of the Federal Reserve's financial structure section, told
an ABA meeting that post-merger HHI's that fell under a 2200/250 ratio would not be
challenged by the Board. See id. Roades' comment is some evidence that the safe harbor
for bank mergers is actually greater than the 1800/200 ratio the Board holds it out to be.
9. See Southern Nat'l Corp., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 596 (1997).
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the dissenters citing concern over the need for divestitures in three
local markets in order to offset the potential adverse effects on
competition threatened by the merger.'" Then, in September, Federal
Reserve Governor Lawrence Meyer issued a warning following the
Board's approval of the Commercial Bank & Trust Co. merger."
Meyer warned that due to the rapid pace of bank mergers the Board
might in the future require more divestitures before granting approval
of merger proposals.' 2  Finally, in December, the Board retracted
even further from its hands off attitude regarding the use of the HHI
Merger Guidelines when it approved the merger of NationsBank
Corporation and Barnett Banks (NB-Barnett)3 after NationsBank
agreed to divest over 100 branches in fifteen markets.14 In signing
off on the deal, the Board released a statement saying that in the
future it would be paying closer attention to merger applications that
exceed the HHI standards, especially those that have potential
adverse effects on a large number of markets. 5
If the Board has shifted its attitude toward bank merger
review, it could mean substantial changes attorneys, banks, and
businesses. After the NB-Barnett decision, one prominent industry
attorney noted that banks may have to work harder to get approval of
questionable proposals. 6 With little indication of bank mergers
declining in 1998 and the Board seemingly taking a firmer stance
regarding the extent that future mergers may exceed the established
guidelines, the next several years may be tough on attorneys and
banking organizations trying to gain approval of mergers that push
10. See id. at 602; see also UCB Merger Leads to Rare Split by Fed, THE Bus. J.
(Charlotte), June 16, 1997, at 3 (discussing the split decision in the Southern National
merger proposal).
11. See Citizens Comm. Bank & Trust Co., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 933 (1997); see also
Federal Bank Regulator Threatens Strict Stance on Future Mergers, THE PORTLAND
OREGONIAN, Sept. 11, 1997, at F7 (discussing the warning issued by Gov. Meyer after the
approval of the Commercial Bank & Trust Co. merger proposal).
12. See Federal Bank Regulator Threatens Strict Stance on Future Mergers, supra note
11, atF7.
13. See NationsBank Corp., 84 Fed. Res. Bull. 129 (1998) [hereinafter NB-Barnett].
14. See R. Christian Bruce, Fed Using NationsBank Approval to Signal Adjustments on
Bank Mergers, 69 Banking Rep. (BNA) 903 (Dec. 22, 1997).
15. See id.
16. See Banks May Have to Work Harder to Make Deals Happen, Expert Says, 69
Banking Rep. (BNA) 904 (Dec. 22, 1997) (statement of Michael Greenspan) [hereinafter
Banks May Have to Work Harder]. Michael Greenspan is a partner with Thompson Coburn
in Washington D. C. See id.
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Merger Guidelines. If attorneys hope to gain approval of
questionable merger applications, they must return to the basics of
showing why proposed mergers will not have adverse effects on
competition despite a post-merger HHI ratio that substantially
exceeds Merger Guidelines.
This Comment discusses in detail the merger applications
approved and denied over the past two years that exceeded the HHI
Merger Guidelines. The scope of this Comment is limited to
evaluating the Board's review of bank merger applications and its
justifications for approving merger applications that substantially
exceeded Merger Guidelines. 17  More specifically, this Comment
begins by explaining the HHI and its use in the review of bank
merger applications. 8 Second, the Comment addresses the bank
merger applications approved during 1996-97 that either used
divestitures to meet Merger Guidelines or exceeded Merger
Guidelines but provided sufficient mitigating factors to gain
approval. 9 Third, the Comment analyzes the mitigating factors
considered by the Board in approving the thirty-one applications that
exceeded Merger Guidelines." Finally, the Comment discusses the
two applications denied approval by the Board during 1996-97 and
the recently approved applications that indicate a less lenient stance
by the Board toward future merger review.
21
II. THE HERFINDAHL-HIRSCHMAN INDEX
Bank mergers are generally controlled by the same legal rules
regarding market concentration as those used in other industries.22
The Bank Merger Acts of 19602' and 196624 and the Bank Holding
17. This Comment does not address bank merger review by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Company, or the Department of
Justice Antitrust Division.
18. See infra notes 22-39 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 40-53 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 54-135 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 136-86 and accompanying text.
22. See ANGLAND, supra note 5, at 1233.
23. Pub. L. No. 86-463, 74 Stat. 129 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)
(1994)).
24. Pub. L. No. 89-356, 80 Stat. 7 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)).
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Company Acte5 incorporate the standards and language of Section 7
of the Clayton Act to formulate the general procedures and rules
governing bank mergers.26 The goal of these laws is to prohibit any
transaction "whose effect in any section of the country may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly,
or which in any other manner would be in restraint of trade ... ."
The agencies enforcing these laws have the added responsibility of
not allowing applications "which would result in a monopoly, or
which would be in furtherance of any combination or conspiracy to
monopolize or to attempt to monopolize the business of banking in
any part of the United States."2
Three federal agencies review most commercial bank
mergers:29 the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), 0 the
Federal Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC),31 and the Board.32
Before a merger can be carried out, each of these three agencies must
approve it.33 The Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ)
must also give a report approving an application before it can go
25. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1994).
26. See id.
27. See id. § 1828(c)(5)(B).
28. See id. § 1828(c)(5)(A).
29. For a discussion on the standards for analyzing the competitive effects of bank
mergers by the three agencies; see generally Martha Vestal Clarke, The Impact of Emerging
Payment Systems and Products on Banking Competition and the Competitive Analysis of
Bank Mergers and Acquisitions, 16 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 161, 171-86 (1997); Yvonne S.
Quinn, Practical Aspects of Defending Bank Mergers Before the Federal Reserve Board
and Department of Justice, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 91, 101-04 (1993) (comparing Federal
Reserve Board and Department of Justice bank merger review standards).
30. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2)(A) (1994); see also ANGLAM, supra note 5, at 1235.
The OCC reviews applications "where the 'acquiring, assuming or resulting bank' is a
national bank." See id. If a merger were between two state chartered banks, it could be
possible that the merging banks would not need approval of the OCC. See JONATHAN R.
MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 446-48 (2d ed. 1997).
31. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2)(C) (1994); see also ANGLAND, supra note 5, at 1235.
The FDIC reviews applications "where the acquiring or resulting bank will be a federally-
insured, state-chartered bank that is not a member of the Federal Reserve System." See id.
32. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2)(B) (1994); see also Angland, supra note 5, at 1235.
The Board reviews applications "where the acquiring or resulting bank will be a state-
chartered bank that is a member of the Federal Reserve System." See id. Board approval is
also needed when Bank Holding Companies are involved in the proposed mergers. See
MACEY & MILLER, supra note 30, at 446-48.
33. See supra note 30 for a situation when not all three agencies would need to approve
a merger.
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through.34 As noted above, this comment is limited to a discussion of
the Board's review of bank mergers during 1996-97.
The Board, like the other reviewing agencies, uses several
steps to decide whether to approve a merger application. After the
Board specifies the product and geographic market, it analyzes the
market(s) degree of concentration before and after the proposed
transaction.3" The Board uses the HHI, which "is a function of the
number of firms in a market and their respective market shares," to
measure post-merger market concentration.36
The HHI is calculated by squaring the market shares
controlled by the individual market participants and adding the totals
together.3 7  The Board considers both the post-merger market
concentration and the raw increase in market concentration resulting
from the merger.3" A merger will normally be approved, absent
objection from the DOJ, where the post-merger HHI in a relevant
geographic market is 1800 points or less or, if more than 1800,
would have a raw increase of less than 200 points.39 This Comment
will discuss the merger applications approved by the Board during
1996-97 where the post-merger HHI exceeded 1800 points and
increased by more than 200 points.
34. See ANGLAND, supra note 5, at 1235. After the Board approves mergers, the DOJ
can object during a thirty-day holding period. Thus, the DOJ's role in the review process is
more of an oversight role. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 30, at 446-48. The Board is
not required to get a DOJ report before approving applications, but it usually does so as a
matter of practice. See ANGLAND, supra note 5, at 1235.
35. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 30, at 482.
36. 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, 41,557-58 (1992).
37. See id. For example, a market consisting of four firms with markets shares of 30%
for firm A, 30% for firm B, 20% for firm C, and 20% for firm D has an HHI of 2600 (302 +
302 + 202 + 202 = 2600). If firms A and B were to merge, the post-merger HHI would be
4400 (602 +202 + 202). The raw increase in HHI would be 1800 (4400-2600). The post-
merger HHI over the raw increase is the post-merger HHI ratio, 4400/2600 in this example.
38. See id. See supra note 37 for an example of how the Board would calculate the
post-merger HHI and the raw increase in HHI. Also note, the raw increase in market
concentration can be calculated independently of the overall market concentration by
doubling the product of the market shares of the merging firms. For example, the merger of
firms A and B (each with 30% of the market share) from supra note 37 would increase the
HHI by 1800 points (30 x 30 x 2 =1800).
39. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 30, at 484 (citing 54 Fed. Reg. 39,043 (Sept. 22,
1989). Note that the HHI standards applied to bank mergers are less stringent than those in
other industries. For a discussion of the general standards applied to horizontal mergers in
other industries, see generally MACEY & MILLER, supra note 30, at 482-84. See infra note
107 and accompanying text for a more specific example of how the standards are less
stringent than in other industries and how that affects the bank merger review process.
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III. BANK MERGERS APPROVED DURING 1996-97
Bank merger applications that could not initially meet the
HII Merger Guidelines gained the Board's approval in several ways.
First, several applications used divestitures to meet Merger
Guidelines and to fall within the Hi safe harbor.4" Second,
numerous applications used mitigating factors or a combination of
mitigating factors and divestitures to gain the Board's approval.4
This section discusses how both types of applications circumvented
problems with HHI Merger Guidelines and gained the Board's
approval of otherwise questionable merger proposals.
A. Pure Divestiture Proposals
During 1996-97, the Board approved twenty applications that
initially exceeded Merger Guidelines and included divestitures as
part of their proposal.42 Of those twenty applications, the Board
approved eight that could not meet Merger Guidelines before
divestitures but with divestitures were able to meet the market
concentration guidelines as measured by the HHI.43 In those
40. See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
42. See NB-Barnett, 84 Fed. Res. Bull. 129 (1998); Wachovia Corp., 83 Fed. Res. Bull.
1020 (1997); First Union Corp., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 1012 (1997); Union Planters Corp., 83
Fed. Res. Bull. 928 (1997); Associated Banc-Corp., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 910 (1997);
Mercantile Bancorporation Inc., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 683 (1997); Marshall & Ilsley Corp., 83
Fed. Res. Bull. 672 (1997); Southern Nat'l, 83 Fed. Res. Bull.. 596 (1997); NationsBank
Corp., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 148 (1997) [hereinafter NB-Boatmen's]; Community First
Bancshares, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 110 (1997); First State Bancshares, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 46
(1997); River Valley Bancorp, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 1136 (1996); Bank of Boston Corp., 82
Fed. Res. Bull. 856 (1996); Wells Fargo & Co., 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 445 (1996); Corestates
Fin. Corp., 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 430 (1996); U.S. Bancorp, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 177 (1996);
NationsBank Corp., 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 172 (1996) [hereinafter NB-Bank South];
Boatmen's Bancshares, Inc., 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 167 (1996); Fleet Fin. Group, Inc., 82 Fed.
Res. Bull. 50 (1996).
43. See First Union, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 1012; Marshall & llsley, 83 Fed. Res. Bull.
at 672; Community First Bancshares, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 110; First State Bancshares, 83
Fed. Res. Bull. at 46; Bank of Boston, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 856; Wells Fargo, 82 Fed. Res.
Bull. at 445; NB-Bank South, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 172. The eight proposals approved
during 1996-97 that could not meet the HHI Merger Guidelines before agreeing to
divestitures, but were able to meet the guidelines after making divestitures will be referred
to as "pure divestiture proposals" in this Comment.
1998]
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proposals, the merging banks generally only agreed to divest the
number of branches necessary to allow the merger to meet HHI
Merger Guidelines. As a result, the number of banks and the amount
of deposits divested by each bank in the respective mergers varied
greatly." Using divestitures to meet Merger Guidelines can be
complicated and expensive, in terms of both lost bank business and
costs associated with divestiture. Yet, when merger proposals do not
present satisfactory mitigating factors, divestitures, if successfully
used to meet Merger Guidelines, are a guaranteed way to gain the
Board's approval.4"
B. Hybrid Divestiture Proposals
Of the twenty applications approved by the Board during
1996-97 that included divestitures,46 twelve could not meet Merger
Guidelines even with divestitures in local markets.47 Since these
44. For example, in the First State Bancshares merger, First State only divested one
bank in order to meet the Merger Guidelines for market concentration. See First State
Bancshares, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 46. This is a stark contrast to the Wells Fargo merger
where 61 branches and $2.5 billion in deposits were divested in order to meet the Merger
Guidelines for market concentration. See Wells Fargo, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 446.
45. For example, the Board approved the merger of NationsBank Corporation,
Charlotte, North Carolina (NationsBank), with Bank South Corporation, Atlanta, Georgia
(Bank South) after divestitures were used to meet HHI Merger Guidelines. See NB-Bank
South, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 172. Before the merger, NationsBank and Bank South
competed directly in five markets in Georgia. See id. Without divestitures, two markets, the
Fitzgerald and Savannah markets, would have had a significant increase in market
concentration. See id. In the Fitzgerald market, the HHI would have increased by 716
points to 2827, and in the Savannah market, the HHI would have increased by 213 points to
1827. See id. at 172 n.10. To meet the Merger Guidelines and mitigate the potential
adverse market effects of the merger, NationsBank agreed to sell one branch in the
Fitzgerald market to an out-of-market competitor. As a result, the HHI in that market
remained unchanged. See id. at 173. To mitigate the adverse effects on competition in the
Savannah market, NationsBank sold one branch to a market competitor. This divestiture
allowed the HHI to increase by 185 points to 1799 in the Savannah market, and
correspondingly met Merger Guidelines. See id. The Board concluded that in light of the
divestitures and the numerous competitors that remained in both the Fitzgerald and
Savannah markets, the merger was not likely to adversely affect market competition. See
id.
46. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
47. See NB-Barnett 84 Fed. Res. Bull. at 129; River Valley, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 1136;
Wachovia, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 1020; Union Planters, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 928;
Associated Banc-Corp., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 910; Mercantile, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 683;
Southern Nat', 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 596; NB-Boatmen's, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 148;
Corestates Fin., 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 430; U.S. Bancorp, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 177;
Boatmen's Bancshares, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 167; Fleet Fin., 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 50.
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proposals could not meet Merger Guidelines with divestitures, the
merging banks had to give the Board additional reasons not to deny
their applications. Consequently, the Board was able to justify the
approval of these twelve proposals only after concluding that other
mitigating factors were present in addition to the divestitures.48 Most
of the banks in the hybrid group used divestitures as a means solely
to reduce their share of the market concentration. Thus, the banks
were able to meet Merger Guidelines in most of the markets that
exceeded the HHI safe harbor. The only difference between the
"Hybrids" will be used in this Comment to describe the twelve proposals approved due to a
combination of divestitures and mitigating factors, which the Board felt reduced the
potential anti-competitive effects of those proposals threatened by their post-merger HHI
ratios.
48. For example, the Board approved the acquisition by Fleet Financial Group, Inc.,
(Fleet) of Shawmut National Corporation, (Shawmut) after considering divestitures made
by Fleet and several mitigating factors. See Fleet Fin., 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 50. Of the 26
markets where Fleet and Shawmut competed directly, 12 could not meet Merger Guidelines
for market concentration without divestitures. See id. at 51. Even with divestitures, two
markets, Hartford and Old Saybrook, both in Connecticut, were not within the HHI Merger
Guidelines safe harbor. In those two markets, the Board used a combination of divestitures
and other mitigating factors to justify its approval of the merger.
1. Hartford Banking Market
Upon consummation of the merger, without divestitures, Fleet would have become
the largest depository institution in the Hartford banking market representing nearly 50% of
market deposits. Fleet entered divestiture agreements to sell 25 branches and approximately
$1.6 billion of deposits to mitigate the potential anti-competitive effects of this merger on
the Hartford market. However, even with divestitures, the HHI increased 469 points to
1827. See id. at 51. In addition to the divestitures, the Board cited three reasons that the
HHI tended to overstate the effect on competition that this merger would have on the
Hartford market: as a result of the divestitures, two depository institutions in the market
became more competitive, a large number of competitors remained in the market after the
merger, and the market was attractive for entry. See id. at 52.
2. Old Saybrook Banking Market
Without divestitures, on consummation of the merger Fleet also would have
become the largest depository institution in the Old Saybrook market, representing 33.2%
of market deposits, and controlling $167 million in deposits. To reduce the potential
adverse effects on competition in the Old Saybrook market, Fleet agreed to divest two
branches and $32.3 million in deposits. Even with the divestitures, the HHI in the market
increased 298 points to 1904, exceeding the HHI Merger Guidelines. See id. The Board
cited three factors mitigating the potential adverse effects on the Old Saybrook market: six
depository institutions competent to compete with Fleet remained in the market after the
merger, thrift institutions in the Old Saybrook market provide a full range of banking
services and competed with the commercial banks, and the Old Saybrook market was
uniquely situated such that an unusually large number of banking and business alternatives
were available for market residents. See id.
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hybrid proposals and the pure divestiture proposals is that the hybrids
were not able to meet Merger Guidelines in all of the markets where
the merging banks directly competed.49
Banks involved in the hybrid proposals used divestitures to
place their applications closer to meeting Merger Guidelines and to
strengthen their arguments that the post-merger HHI ratios tended to
overstate the merger's anti-competitive effects on the markets
concerned. Furthermore, the divestitures showed that the merging
banks realized the potential adverse effects on competition raised by
their merger proposals, and that they were taking steps to reduce
those effects. These steps, combined with the mitigating factors
found in each merger, helped the merging banks convince the Board
to approve their applications. Appendix A provides a listing of the
hybrid proposals the Board approved and the mitigating factors the
Board considered in its decision to approve each application.
C. Solely Mitigating Factor Proposals
During 1996-97, the Board approved nineteen merger
applications that exceeded the HHI Merger Guidelines after
concluding that there were sufficient mitigating factors present to
minimize the proposed merger's potential adverse effects on
competition.50 In those nineteen applications, numerous mitigating
49. In 10 of the 12 proposals, divestitures permitted the merger candidate to meet HHI
Merger Guidelines in all markets except one or two. Compare with NB-Barnett, 84 Fed.
Res. Bull. 129 (stating that seven markets needed additional mitigating factors to reduce the
potential anti-competitive effects of the proposed merger) and Southern Nat', 83 Fed. Res.
Bull. at 597 (stating that seven markets needed additional mitigating factors to reduce the
potential anti-competitive effects of the proposed merger).
50. See First of Waverly Corp., 84 Fed. Res. Bull. 111 (1998); First Nat'l Sec. Co., 84
Fed. Res. Bull. 58 (1998); Citizens Comm., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 933 (1997); Barnett Banks,
Inc., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 916 (1997); Exchange Bancshares Corp., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 671
(1997); Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 612 (1997); NationsBank Corp.,
83 Fed. Res. Bull. 593 (1997) [hereinafter NB-First Nat'l]; Shoreline Fin. Corp., 83 Fed.
Res. Bull. 515 (1997); G.B. Fin. Ser., Inc., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 509 (1997); First Union
Corp., 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 1123 (1996); Nacogdoches Commercial Bancshares, Inc., 82 Fed.
Res. Bull. 1121 (1996); Interwest Bancorp, Inc., 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 944 (1996); First
Merchants Corp., 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 942 (1996); First S. Bancorp, Inc., 82 Fed. Res. Bull.
854 (1996); Banco Santander, S.A. 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 833 (1996); Community Bancshares
82 Fed. Res. Bull. 735 (1996); Aspen Bancshares, Inc., 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 665 (1996); First
Bank Sys., Inc., 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 169 (1996); Norwest, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 156 (1996).
"Solely mitigating factors proposals" is used in this Comment to refer to the 19 proposals
approved by the Board based solely on mitigating factors that tended to reduce the adverse
354 [Vol. 2
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factors were cited." Factors such as the number of competitors
remaining in the market, the attractiveness of the market for entry,
and the amount the HHI exceeded Merger Guidelines were some of
the most commonly cited. 2 Appendix B lists the solely mitigating
factor proposals the Board approved during 1996-97 and summarizes
the factors that the Board considered mitigating in each application.
The next section provides an in-depth discussion of the actual
mitigating factors considered by the Board in the twelve hybrid and
nineteen solely mitigating factors proposals. 3
IV. MITIGATING FACTORS ANALYSIS
The Board approved thirty-one merger proposals during
1996-97 where the post-merger HHI substantially exceeded Merger
Guidelines. 4 Of those thirty-one, the Board approved nineteen after
it concluded sufficient mitigating factors were present to minimize
the potential adverse effects on competition threatened by the
proposal. 5 A combination of divestitures and various mitigating
factors was used to gain approval in the other twelve applications. 6
effects on market competition threatened by the proposed merger.
51. See infra notes 54-135 and accompanying text.
52. The First Bank System application is a good example of a typical application where
the Merger Guidelines were exceeded but the proposal was approved based solely on the
presence of mitigating factors. In that proposal, First Bank System Inc. (FBS), sought
approval of a merger with FirstTier Financial, Inc. (FirstTier) based on several mitigating
factors. See First Bank, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 169. FBS and FirstTier directly competed in
four markets prior to the merger proposal. Consummation of the proposal would have
caused the market concentration as measured by the HHI to exceed Merger Guidelines in
the Lincoln, Nebraska, banking market. See id. at 171. In that market, the proposed merger
would have increased the HHI by 222 points to 2207. See id.
The Board identified three factors that mitigated the potential adverse competitive
effects on the Lincoln market threatened by the proposal. One, 18 competitors would
remain in the market after the merger, including one that controlled 31.2% of the total
deposits in depository institutions in the market. See id. Two, the market was attractive for
out-of-market entry. Four factors made the market attractive for entry: (1) the market was
the second most populous in Nebraska, (2) market population growth exceeded the national
average between 1980-1992, (3) the market's unemployment rate was half that of the
national average, and (4) the market's per capita income exceeded the national average. See
id. Finally, the Merger Guidelines were only exceeded by a small amount. See id. For
these reasons, the Board approved the merger of FSB and FirstTier despite the post-merger
HHI ratio in the Lincoln Market substantially exceeding the Merger Guidelines. See id.
53. See infra notes 54-135 and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 47, 50 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 50.
56. See supra note 47.
356 NORTH CAROL1NA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 2
The Board cited fourteen different mitigating factors in those thirty-
one proposals. 7
A. Number of Competitors Remaining in the Market as a
Mitigating Factor
The most commonly cited mitigating factor was the number
of competitors remaining in the market. In eighteen of the nineteen
applications approved solely based on the presence of mitigating
factors,58 and in all twelve hybrid proposals,59 the number of
competitors remaining in the market was cited as a mitigating factor.
Even more notable, within the twelve hybrid proposals, the Board
considered the number of remaining competitors as a mitigating
factor in all thirty markets where the Merger Guidelines threshold
was exceeded." The number of competitors remaining in the market
ranged form four to fifty-eight.
57. See infra notes 54-135 notes and accompanying text (discussing the use of
mitigating factors in the bank merger review process).
58. See First Waverly, 84 Fed. Res. Bull. 111,112 (1998); First Nat'l Sec., 84 Fed. Res.
Bull. 58, 59 (1998); Citizens Comm., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 933, 934 (1997); Barnett Banks, 83
Fed. Res. Bull. 916, 917 (1997); Exchange Bancshares, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 671 (1997);
Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 612, 613 (1997); NB-First Nat'l, 83 Fed.
Res. Bull. 593, 595 (1997); Shoreline Fin., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 515, 516-17 (1997);
Nacogdoches, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 1121, 1122 (1996); First Union, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 1123,
1125 (1996); First Merchants, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 942, 943 (1996); Interwest Bancorp, 82
Fed. Res. Bull. 944, 945 (1996); Banco Santander, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 833, 834 (1996); First
S. Bancorp, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 854, 855 (1996); Community Bancshares, 82 Fed. Res. Bull.
735, 736 (1996); Aspen Bancshares, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 665, 666 (1996); First Bank, 82
Fed. Res. Bull. 169, 170 (1996); Norwest, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 156, 157 (1996). See
Appendix B. Compare BancSecurity Corp., 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 122, 125-26 (1996) (holding
13 depository institutions remaining in the market was not a mitigating factor).
59. See NB-Barnett, 84 Fed. Res. Bull. 129, 132-34 (1998); Wachovia, 83 Fed. Res.
Bull. 1020, 1021 (1997); Union Planters, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 928, 929 (1997); Associated
Banc-Corp., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 910, 912 (1997); Mercantile, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 684;
Southern Nat'l Corp., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 596, 598-602 (1997); NB-Boatmen's, 83 Fed. Res.
Bull. 148, 150 (1997); River Valley, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 1136, 1138 (1996); Corestates Fin.,
82 Fed. Res. Bull. 430, 432 (1996); U.S. Bancorp, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 177, 178 (1996);
Boatmen's Bancshares, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 167, 168 (1996); Fleet Fin., 82 Fed. Res. Bull.
50, 52 (1996). See Appendix A.
60. See NB-Barnett, 84 Fed. Res. Bull. at 132-34; Wachovia, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at
1021; Associated Banc-Corp., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 912; Union Planters, 83 Fed. Res. Bull.
at 929; Mercantile, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 684; Southern Nat'l, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 598-602;
NB-Boatmen's, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 150; River Valley, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 1138;
Corestates Fin., 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 432; U.S. Bancorp, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 178;
Boatmen's Bancshares, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 168; Fleet Fin., 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 52. See
Appendix A.
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B. Nature of the Remaining Competitors
The Board considered not only the number of competitors
remaining in the market but also the nature of those competitors. In
seventeen of the thirty merger proposals where the number of
remaining competitors was cited as a mitigating factor, the Board
also considered the amount of market deposits controlled by the
remaining competitors.61  Where the remaining competitors
controlled a significant share of the market deposits, the Board
considered the merger less likely to have adverse effects on market
competition.
In addition to the market deposits controlled by the remaining
competitors, the Board considered the size of the remaining
competitors. Specifically, when the remaining competitors were
bank holding companies,62 subsidiaries of bank holding companies,63
multi-billion dollar banking organizations,' large multi-state banking
organizations,65or large in size relative to other banks in the state or
in similar markets,66 the Board concluded that the merger was
unlikely to adversely affect market competition.
61. See NB-Barnett, 84 Fed. Res. Bull. at 132-34; First Nat 7 Sec. 84 Fed. Res. Bull. at
59; Wachovia, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 1021; Barnett Banks, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 917;
Exchange Bancshares, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 671; Shoreline Fin., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 516-
17; NB-Boatmen's, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 150; River Valley, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 1138; First
Union, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 1125; Nacogdoches, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 1122; Interwest
Bancorp, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 945; First Merchants, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 943; First S.
Bancorp, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 855; Aspen Bancshares, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 666; First
Bank, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 170; Norwest, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 157; Fleet Fin., 82 Fed. Res.
Bull. at 52.
62. See First Nat ' Sec., 84 Fed. Res. Bull. at 59; Wachovia, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 1021;
Citizens Comm., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 934; InterwestBancorp, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 945.
63. See First Union, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 1125.
64. See Shoreline Fin., 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 516-17.
65. See NB-Barnett, 84 Fed. Res. Bull. at 132-34.
66. See Union Planters, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 928, 929 (1997); Barnett Banks, 83 Fed.
Res. Bull. at 917; Southern Nat'l, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 596, 599-602 (1997); Boatmen's
Bancshares, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 167, 168 (1996); Fleet Fin., 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 52.
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C. Attractiveness for Market Entry as a Mitigating Factor
The second most commonly cited mitigating factor was the
market's attractiveness for entry.67 In numerous merger applications,
this factor was instrumental in mitigating the potential adverse
effects on competition threatened by the proposals.68 The Board
cited numerous factors making a market attractive for entry.
1. Population Factors Making a Market Attractive for Entry
In the solely mitigating factors proposals, various aspects of
the market's population were cited in seven proposals as making a
non-complying market attractive for entry.69 The biggest factor
concerning population in these seven proposals was its growth in the
market. For example, when the population growth exceeded the
national 70 or state average,71 increased at a higher rate than the
surrounding rural areas72 or other similar counties," or increased by a
large amount in general, 74 the Board considered the population
growth a factor making the market attractive for entry. Also, in these
seven proposals, the Board considered the market population
67. The Board found the markets where the Merger Guidelines were exceeded
attractive for entry in 8 of the 19 applications approved solely due to the presence of
mitigating factors, see Barnett Banks, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 917; Shoreline Fin., 83 Fed.
Res. Bull. at 516-17; First Union, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 1125; Nacogdoches, 82 Fed. Res.
Bull. 1121, 1122 (1996); Interwest Bancorp, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 945; First Merchants, 82
Fed. Res. Bull. 942, 943 (1996); Aspen Bancshares, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 665, 666 (1996);
First Bank, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 169, 170 (1996), and in 10 of the 12 hybrid applications, see
Wachovia., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 1021; Associated Banc-Corp., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 910, 912
(1997); Mercantile, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 683, 684 (1997); Southern Nat '/83 Fed. Res. Bull. at
598-602; Corestates Fin., 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 430, 432 (1996); U.S. Bancorp, 82 Fed. Res.
Bull. 177, 179 (1996); Boatmen's Bancshares, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 168; NB-Boatmen's,
83 Fed. Res. Bull. 148, 150 (1997); Fleet Fin., 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 50, 52.
68. See supra note 67.
69. See Barnett Banks, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 917; Shoreline Fin., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at
516-17; First Union, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 1125; Nacogdoches, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 1122;
Interwest Bancorp, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 945; Aspen Bancshares, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 666;
First Bank, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 170.
70. See First Bank, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 170.
71. See Barnett Banks, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 917; Shoreline Fin., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at
516-17.
72. See Aspen Bancshares, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 666.
73. See Nacogdoches, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 1122.
74. See First Union, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 1125; Interwest Bancorp, 82 Fed. Res, Bull.
at 945.
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compared to other similarly situated markets in the state. When the
market was one of the state's most populous, the Board considered
that a factor making the market attractive for entry.75 Finally, if the
population per banking office exceeded the average population per
banking office in other similarly situated markets, the Board
considered the market attractive for entry.76
Aspects of the population of the market were also the leading
factors making a market attractive for entry among the twelve hybrid
proposals.77 The Board made a direct link between population
growth and the attractiveness of a non-complying market for entry.
For example, in six hybrid proposals the Board cited some form of
population growth as making a market attractive for entry.7" The
Board also cited other general aspects of market population as
making a market attractive for entry in two hybrid proposals.79 When
trying to evaluate the attractiveness of a market for entry, a good
place to start is by evaluating the different aspects of a non-
complying market's population, especially its growth. The Board
cited numerous other factors that made a market attractive for entry.
2. Other Factors Making a Market Attractive for Entry
The Board cited a number of factors in addition to the
population factors that made a market attractive for entry.80 First, the
Board noted that three aspects of market deposits made a market
75. See Nacogdoches, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 1122; First Bank, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 170.
76. See Barnett Banks, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 917; Nacogdoches, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at
1122.
77. The Board considered population in its analysis of the attractiveness of a market for
entry in sixteen markets of seven hybrid proposals. See NB-Barnett 84 Fed. Res. Bull. 129,
132-34 (1998); Mercantile, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 683, 684 (1997); Southern Nat'l Corp., 83
Fed. Res. Bull. 596, 598-602 (1997); Corestates Fin., 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 430, 432 (1996);
U.S. Bancorp, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 177, 179 (1996); Boatmen's Bancshares, 82 Fed. Res.
Bull. 167, 168 (1996); NB-Boatmen's, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 148, 150 (1996).
78. See NB-Barnett, 84 Fed. Res. Bull. at 132-34; Mercantile, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at
684; Southern Nat', 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 598-602; Corestates Fin., 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at
432; US. Bancorp, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 179; Boatmen's Bancshares, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at
168; NB-Boatmen's, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 150.
79. See Southern Nat', 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 600; Boatmen's Bancshares, 82 Fed. Res.
Bull. at 168.
80. Unlike the previous section, this section does not separate the "other factors"
making a market attractive for entry from those cited in solely mitigating factors proposals
and those cited in hybrid proposals.
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attractive for entry: growth,"' a relatively high level of total
deposits, 2 and an above average number of deposits per banking
office. 3 Second, recent market entry by other banking organizations
made a market attractive for entry. In twelve merger applications,
banks had recently entered the non-complying market or had made
known their intention to enter the market. 4 It did not seem to matter
to the Board whether the recent entries were de novo or by
acquisition. However, the Board did seem to give greater weight to
recent entries made with the intention of entering the market than to
those where entry had been made merely incidental to acquisition.86
Finally, the Board concluded seven other factors made a market
attractive for entry: the size of the market," a low unemployment
rate,"8 a relatively high per capita income, 9 a higher rate of return
than banks statewide," a period of recent job growth,9 a relatively
high household income ranking,92 and new roads connecting the
market to a nearby larger city.93
81. See NB-Barnett 84 Fed. Res. Bull. at 132-34; Barnett Banks, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at
917; Southern Nat'l, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 599, 601-02; Shoreline Fin., 83 Fed. Res. Bull.
515, 516-17 (1997); First Merchants, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 942, 943 (1996); NB-Boatmen's,
83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 150.
82. See Mercantile, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 684; Southern Nat', 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at
602; Nacogdoches, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 1121, 1122 (1996).
83. See NB-Barnett 84 Fed. Res. Bull. at 132; Barnett Banks, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 917;
Associated Banc-Corp., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 910, 912 (1997); Mercantile, 83 Fed. Res. Bull.
at 684; Southern Nat'l, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 599; Nacogdoches, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 1122.
84. See NB-Barnett, 84 Fed. Res. Bull. at 132-34; Wachovia, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 1020,
1021 (1997); Citizens Comm., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 933, 934 (1997); Associated Banc-Corp.,
83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 912; Barnett Banks, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 917; Southern Nat', 83 Fed.
Res. Bull. at 599; Shoreline Fin., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 516-17; Nacogdoches, 82 Fed. Res.
Bull.at 1122; First Merchants, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 943; U.S. Bancorp, 82 Fed. Res. Bull.
177, 179; NB-Boatmen's, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 150; Fleet Fin., 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 50, 52.
85. See Nacogdoches, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 1122; First Merchants, 82 Fed. Res. Bull.
at 943.
86. See Shoreline Fin., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 516-17.
87. See First Union, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 1125; U.S. Bancorp, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at
179; Fleet Fin., 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 52.
88. See First Bank, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 169, 170.
89. See NB-Barnett, 84 Fed. Res. Bull. at 132,134; Wachovia, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at
1021; Associated Banc-Corp., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 912; Mercantile, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 683,
684 (1997); Southern Nat'l, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 599, 601-02; First Bank, 82 Fed. Res.
Bull. at 170.
90. See Aspen Bancshares, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 665, 666 (1996); Boatmen's Bancshares,
82 Fed. Res. Bull. 167, 168 (1996).
91. See First Merchants, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 942, 943 (1996).
92. See Wachovia, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 1020, 1021 (1997); Corestates Fin., 82 Fed. Res.
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Where the Board found the markets attractive for entry, it was
willing to give less weight to post-merger HI ratios that
substantially exceeded Merger Guidelines. In every proposal where
the Board classified a market as attractive for entry, it used a
combination of the above factors.94 Although no single factor
seemed controlling in the Board's decisions to classify certain
markets as attractive for entry, it appeared that population factors,
especially growth, and recent market entry by other banks, were
significant to the Board.9 Also, when deciding what factors made a
market attractive for entry, the Board seemed to make no real
distinction between the hybrid and solely mitigating factors
proposals.
D. Amount Post-Merger HHI Exceeds Merger Guidelines
Another mitigating factor the Board considered was the
amount the post-merger EHI exceeded Merger Guidelines. 96
Changes in the HI that only exceeded Merger Guidelines by a
"small amount" were considered mitigating.97  The Board did not
specifically state what would constitute a "small amount." It did,
however, make note in two cases where it considered the HH to
exceed the Merger Guidelines by only a "small amount." In First
Bank System, the HI increased 222 points to 2207,98 and in
Norwest Corporation, the HI increased 201 points to 2066."9
Therefore, it seems safe to say that if the raw increase in HHI is 222
points or less and the post-merger HHI does not exceed 2207 points,
the Board would consider the HEI only to have exceeded Merger
Guidelines by a "small amount" and would give that factor some
mitigating value. The fact that the Board found the small increase in
HiH to be a mitigating factor is basically consistent with the
Bull. 430, 432 (1996).
93. See Southern Nat'l Corp., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 596, 600 (1997).
94. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 69-78, 84-86 and accompanying text.
96. See First Bank, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 169, 170 (1996); Norwest, 82 Fed. Res. Bull.
156, 157 (1996). Cf. First Waverly 84 Fed. Res. Bull. 111, 112 (1998) (noting a small
change in market concentration as a mitigating factor).
97. See First Bank, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 170; Norwest, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 157.
98. See First Bank, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 170.
99. See Norwest, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 157.
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representations made by the Board that mergers falling under a
2200/250 HFI ratio will face "clear sailing" through the review
process.'
E. Other Factors Mitigating Potential Adverse Effects on
Market Competition
In eight applications, the Board cited ease of entry into the
market as a mitigating circumstance.' 0 1 Low state legal barriers to
bank expansion was the most specific factor the Board noted as
making a market easy to enter. Once the Board established that the
state allowed for interstate and statewide banking it was quick to find
low legal barriers to market entry in all eight applications.0 2 Since
low legal barriers made it easy for banks to enter the markets in
question, the Board gave less weight to the potential anti-competitive
effects in those markets predicted by their high post-merger HHI
ratios.
In several proposals, credit unions or savings and loan
associations (thrifts) competing in a market also mitigated the anti-
competitive effects of applications in numerous proposals.'O3 The
Board considered credit union participation in a market as a
mitigating factor if the credit union was large'"4 or made up a
substantial portion of market deposits.'0 5 When thrifts provided a full
100. See Bruce, supra note 8, at 712. In the Board's representation, merger proposals
that have a raw increase of 250 points or less and have a total post-merger HHI of 2200
points or less will not be challenged by the Board during the review process. See id.
101. See Associated Banc-Corp., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 910, 912 (1997); Shoreline Fin., 83
Fed. Res. Bull. 515, 516-17 (1997); First Union, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 1123, 1125 (1996);
Nacogdoches, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 1121, 1122 (1996); Interwest Bancorp, 82 Fed. Res. Bull,
944, 945 (1996); First Merchants, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 942, 943 (1996); Community
Bancshares, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 735, 736 (1996); Aspen Bancshares, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 665,
667 (1996).
102. See Associated Banc-Corp., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 912; First Union, 82 Fed. Res.
Bull. at 1125; Nacogdoches, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 1122; Interwest Bancorp, 82 Fed. Res.
Bull. at 945; First Merchants, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 943; Community Bancshares, 82 Fed.
Res. Bull. at 736; Aspen Bancshares, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 667; Shoreline Fin., 83 Fed. Res.
Bull. at 516-17.
103. See Shoreline Fin., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 516-17; Norwest, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at
157.
104. See Southern Nat'l Corp., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 596, 602 (1997); Shoreline Fin., 83
Fed. Res. Bull. at 516-17; Boatmen's Bancshares, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 167, 168 (1996);
Norwest, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 157; Fleet Fin., 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 50, 52.
105. See Shoreline Fin., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 516-17; Boatmen's Bancshares, 82 Fed.
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range of banking services and/or could compete with the market's
commercial banks, the Board said this mitigated the mergers
potential anti-competitive effects on competition. 6 An interesting
point to note is that part of the reason the guideline for raw HHI
increase in bank mergers is 200, as opposed to 50 or 100 as it is in
guidelines for other industries, is because the guidelines for bank
mergers take into account limited purpose lenders, such as credit
unions and thrifts, and other non-depository financial entities.1"7 By
counting credit union and thrift participation in the markets as a
mitigating factor, the Board may in essence be counting these
institutions twice. This further supports the argument that in the past
few years the Board has reviewed bank mergers leniently with regard
to the HIHL.
Physical market descriptions and various reasonable ways to
calculate the HiH were additional factors that the Board found
mitigated potential adverse effects on market competition. For
example, when the non-complying markets were small,108 rural, 0 9
sparsely populated,"0 or strategically located near other comparable
business and banking alternatives,"' the Board decided that the HIH
might overstate the anti-competitive effects of the merger. Also, in
three applications, the Board concluded there was more than one
reasonable way to calculate the market HI. Thus, after
recalculating the HiM, the Board concluded that the HI overstated
the anti-competitive effects of the proposal and went on to approve
the application." 2
Res. Bull. at 168.
106. See Southern Nat'l, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 602; Fleet Fin., 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 52.
107. See AmSouth Bancorporation, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 351, 352 n.3 (1987); see e.g., NB-
Barnett, 84 Fed. Res. Bull. 129, 142 n. 11 (1998).
108. See.First S. Bancorp, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 854, 855 (1996).
109. See First Waverly, 84 Fed. Res. Bull. 111,112 (1998); First Nat'l Sec., 84 Fed. Res.
Bull. 58, 59 (1998); Citizens Comm., 83 Fed. Res. Bull.. 933, 934; Union Planters, 83 Fed.
Res. Bull. 928, 929 (1997); Community Bancshares, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 735,736 (1996);
Exchange Bancshares, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 671.
110. See Community Bancshares, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 736. Note: Do not confuse this
mitigating factor with the population factors making a market attractive for entry.
11. See Fleet Fin., 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 52.
112. In Banco Santander, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 833, 834-35 (1996), and Banco Popular de
Puerto Rico, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 612, 613 (1997), if cooperatives (commonwealth-insured
depository institutions that provide a wide range of banking services to customers including
transaction accounts, personal loans, and small business loans) were included in the HHI
calculation, the proposal would have met Merger Guidelines. In Interwest Bancorp, 82 Fed.
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Another factor mitigating a merger's potential adverse effects
on competition was the competitive trend in the market in the years
prior to the proposed merger. When the HHI decreased in the years
prior to the merger, adverse effects were mitigated." 3  Adverse
effects were also mitigated when the largest depository institution's
share of market deposits had decreased and the smallest depository
institutions' market shares had increased."4 Generally, the Board
viewed recent trends making markets more competitive as reducing
the anti-competitive effects of proposed mergers in those markets."'
The Board also used the product focus and customer make-
ups of the merging banks as mitigating factors."6  In Aspen
Bancshares, the merging banks dealt primarily with mortgage and
commercial lending respectively." 7 Since the merging banks really
did not compete for the same product or the same customers, the
Board felt the HI overstated the anti-competitive effects of the
merger."' In Exchange Bancshares, a substantial portion of the bank
customers involved were military personnel living outside the
market." 9 The Board considered this a mitigating factor as well.'
In five hybrid proposals, the Board concluded several factors
stemming from divestitures reduced the adverse effects on market
competition threatened by the proposed merger.', In Fleet
Financial, 12 divestitures allowed two depository institutions in the
non-complying market to increase their amount of deposits and their
Res. Bull. 944, 943 (1996), if the abnormally high number of government deposits was
excluded from the HHI calculation and the HHI calculation was based solely on IPC
deposits (individual, partnership, and corporations), the mergers would have met Merger
Guidelines in the non-complying market.
113. See Southern Nat'l Corp., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 596, 599 (1997); River Valley, 82
Fed. Res. Bull. 1136, 1138 (1996).
114. See River Valley, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 1136.
115. Cf NB-Bamett, 84 Fed. Res. Bull. at 129, 130 (1998) (discussing the fast growth of
Florida's banking industry).
116. Arguably, these factors were decided in the phase of the review that evaluates the
appropriate product market and should not be considered again as a mitigating factor.
117. See Aspen Bancshares, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 665, 666 (1996).
118. See id.
119. See Exchange Bancshares, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 671.
120. See id.
121. See Southern Nat'l Corp., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 596, 598-99 (1997); U.S. Bancorp, 82
Fed. Res. Bull. 177, 179 (1996); Fleet Fin., 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 50, 52 (1996).
122. 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 52.
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share of market deposits. In Southern National,24 divestitures
caused a similar action in the Goldsboro, North Carolina, banking
market where two smaller competitors increased their market
deposits by three percent. 12' Also in Southern National, divestitures
to an out-of-market competitor allowed a comparable bank to replace
Southern National as the second largest deposit holder in the
Columbus County, North Carolina, banking market.126  The Board
held this replacement reduced the merger's anti-competitive effects
in that market.' In U.S. Bancorp,28 sixteen divestitures in the
Portland banking market reduced U.S. Bancorp's market deposits by
$341 million; the Board held this large reduction in market deposits
mitigated the merger's potential adverse effects on competition.' 29
Finally, in Wachovia Corporation3 ' and NB-Barnett,"' divestitures
allowed the number of competitors in the market to not change as a
result of the proposed merger.3 2  The Board also found this a
mitigating factor.
Finally, the Board found that the special circumstances
surrounding three of the merger applications mitigated those
mergers' potential adverse effects on market competition. 113  This
123. See id.
124. 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 598-99.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 177, 178-79 (1996).
129. See id.
130. 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 1020, 1021 (1997).
131. 84 Fed. Res. Bull. 129, 133-34 91998).
132. See NB-Barnett, 84 Fed. Res. Bull. at 133-34; Wachovia, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at
1021.
133. In G.B Financial Services, the merging banks had a long history of affiliation and
were controlled by basically the same Board of Directors and shareholders for the years
leading up to the merger proposal. This situation mitigated the potential anti-competitive
effects of the merger, since the market would not really change after the merger. See G.B
Fin. Services, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 509, 510 (1997). In NB-First Nat'l, after the merger,
NationsBank would be acting solely in a fiduciary relationship for family trusts they
acquired as part of an acquisition where they acquired banks that were holding the trusts at
the time of the merger. Since NationsBank was acting solely in a fiduciary relationship and
controlled only a small voting share in each bank, the possible adverse effects of the merger
were mitigated. See NB-First Nat'l, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 593, 595 (1997). In Southern
National, since the amount of market deposits the largest competitor controlled in the
Columbus County, North Carolina, banking market after the merger was only a small
amount larger than the amount of market deposits controlled by the largest competitor
before the merger, the adverse effects on competition threatened by the proposed merger
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special circumstances mitigating factor was unique to the proposals
and markets in question and was used in addition to other mitigating
factors in the market. 34
The mitigating factors the Board found in the hybrid and in
the solely mitigating factors proposals were identical in some
respects and very different in others. In both types of proposals, the
Board cited some of the same factors, such as the number of
competitors remaining in the market and attractiveness of a market
for entry. However, the Board did cite some factors that were unique
to the hybrid proposals like the factors deriving from divestitures. In
both sets of proposals, the Board used a combination of factors to
mitigate the anti-competitive effects of the questionable mergers.
The Board did not indicate that any of the factors cited in either set
of proposals would have been sufficient by themselves to mitigate
the potential adverse effects of the mergers, but it did seem to give
substantial weight to the number of competitors remaining in the
market and the market's attractiveness for entry.135 These two factors
were prevalent in almost every proposal the Board approved where
the HHI Merger Guidelines were exceeded. Barring a unique
situation or outlier, any successful proposal to the Board where the
HHI Merger Guidelines have been exceeded will need to contain
these mitigating factors, regardless of whether the proposal is a
hybrid or one that only cites mitigating factors.
V.. PROPOSALS DENIED DUE To POST-MERGER HHI RATIOS
EXCEEDING MERGER GUIDELINES AND THE BOARD'S SHIFTING
APPROACH TOWARD MERGER REVIEW
The large number of mergers approved over the last two years
despite post-merger HHI ratios that exceeded Merger Guidelines are
strong evidence that the Board has been less than stringent in its
application of the Merger Guidelines during the bank merger review
process. In fact, one could argue that the Board really does not apply
the guidelines except in the most extraordinary circumstances.
were mitigated. See Southern Nat'l Corp, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 596, 598 (1997).
134. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
135. The number of competitors remaining in the market and the attractiveness of a
market for entry were cited as mitigating factors in thirty and eighteen proposals
respectively. See supra notes 58-59, 67 and accompanying text.
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However, this generalization of the Board's approach to the bank
merger review process may not be solidly founded. Even if this
generalization is solidly founded, it may not hold true for the future.
During 1996-97, the Board did deny two merger applications and
sent out several signals that in the future it was planning to evaluate
bank mergers with respect to the HHI Merger Guidelines more
closely. A leading industry attorney has noted that banks may have
to work harder in the future to gain approval of mergers that push
and exceed the HHI Merger Guidelines.136 This section examines the
two applications the Board denied during 1996-97 and looks at
signals the Board sent out in the latter half of 1997 indicating that in
the future it might be reviewing bank mergers more closely.
A. Applications Denied Approval by the Board
During 1996-97, the Board denied two proposals by bank
holding companies to acquire thrift holding companies. 37 Even
though the two proposals were ultimately denied for different
reasons, they were similar in several respects.
First, the applicants would have been in relatively similar
situations with respect to their market positions after the proposed
mergers. In both First State Bancshares' proposal to acquire First
Southwest Bancorp 3 ' and BancSecurity Corporation's proposal to
acquire Marshalltown Financial Corporation,'39 had the mergers been
approved, they would have more than substantially exceeded the HHI
Merger Guidelines.' Also, the surviving banks in both proposals
would have controlled an inordinate amount of market deposits. 4'
In addition to their unfairly advantageous post-merger
positions, these two proposals were similar in their inability to
136. See Banks May Have to Work Harder, supra note 16, at 904.
137. See BancSecurity Corp., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 122 (1997); First State Bancshares, 82
Fed. Res. Bull. 953 (1996).
138. First State Bancshares, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 953 (1996).
139. BancSecurity Corp., 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 122 (1997).
140. See BancSecurity, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 125 (the HHI would have increased by 849
points to 3032); First State, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 955-56 (the HHI would have increased by
1208 points to 5549).
141. See BancSecurity, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 125 (BancSecurity would have controlled
just less than 50% of market deposits); First State, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 955 (First State
would have controlled more than 66% of market deposits).
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establish the presence of any of the commonly cited mitigating
factors. 14 2  For example, the Board did not find the presence of
competitors remaining in the market a significant mitigating factor in
either denied proposal. 4 3 Without mitigating factors, the merging
banks were left with extraordinarily high post-merger HHI ratios. In
both First State and BancSecurity, the adverse effects on competition
threatened by the high post-merger HHI ratios could not be
discounted through divestitures, mitigating factors, or a combination
of the two. Therefore, the Board followed Merger Guidelines and
refused to approve the applications due to their potential adverse
effects on market competition. 4a
While First State and BancSecurity were aberrations from the
Board's rubber stamp approach to reviewing bank merger
applications, the Board has taken several actions indicating that it
may deny more proposals in the future. The split opinion in the
Southern National merger, 4 Governor Meyer's warning that the
rapid pace of bank mergers might lead the Board to require more
divestitures in future mergers before granting approval,'46 and the
Board's statements following the recent decision in NB-Barnett all
indicate that the Board will probably more closely scrutinize bank
merger proposals in the future. These warning signals are analyzed
below to demonstrate what, if any, impact they may have on industry
attorneys preparing to present to the Board a proposed merger that
will exceed the HHI Merger Guidelines.
B. The Southern National Dissent
Vice Chairwoman Alice Rivlin and Governor Meyer (the
dissenters) believed the Southern National application should have
142. See Appendix C.
143. See First State, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. at 956; BancSecurity, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 125-
26. This is even more important when you consider that thirty of the thirty-one proposals
approved during 1996-97 despite exceeding the HHI Merger Guidelines contained the
number of competitors remaining in the market as a mitigating factor. See supra notes 58,
59 and accompanying text.
144. Appendix C discusses these applications in detail in order to facilitate
understanding why they were not approved while so many other applications were.
145. See Southern Nat'l, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 596, 602 (1997).
146. See Federal Bank Regulator Threatens Strict Stance on Future Mergers, supra note
11, at F7.
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been denied because of its potential adverse effects on competition in
the Columbus County, Statesville, and Goldsboro, all in North
Carolina, banking markets. 47 The Merger Guidelines in all three
non-complying markets were exceeded to a degree found
questionable by the Board. 48 Also, in two of the three non-
complying markets, the surviving bank controlled a large portion of
market deposits.'49 The dissenters argued that additional divestitures
were needed in those markets to reduce the merger's potential anti-
competitive effects. 5'
The dissenters' greatest concerns were over the Columbus
County banking market. In that market, the HHI increased to almost
4500 after the merger, and Southern National controlled nearly sixty-
four percent of market deposits.' 1 The dissenters argued that "failure
to reject the merger or to make the merger conditional on further
divestitures in this market (Columbus County)... sets an undesirable
precedent and allows a level of concentration and market share...
too high to warrant Board approval." 52 Further, the dissenters did
not feel that the mitigating factors cited by the majority reduced the
merger's anti-competitive effects in the Columbus County market.'53
Two banks had planned to enter the Columbus County market.'54
The majority had noted that if these two banks could procure $5
million in deposits, the proposal would meet the HHI Merger
Guidelines in the Columbus County market. 55 The dissenters
contended there was not sufficient evidence to show the two firms
entering the market were likely to obtain the amount of deposits
necessary to reduce the anti-competitive effects of the merger.'56 The
147. See Southern Nat', 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 602.
148. See Southern Nat'l, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 598-99. In the Columbus County market,
the HHI increased by 277 points to 4493; in the Statesville market, the HHI increased 400
points to 2265; and in the Goldsboro market, the HHI increased 248 points to 2295. See id.
149. See Southern Nat', 83 Fed. Res. Bull. at 598-99 (In the Columbus County,
Statesville, and Goldsboro banking markets, Southern National controlled 63.8, 29.8, and
35.6% of market deposits after the merger, respectively).
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. See id. at 598.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 602.
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dissenters concluded there were no other valid mitigating factors.
Therefore, they believed the merger should have been denied unless
further divestitures were made. 1
57
The potential adverse effects on competition in the Statesville
and Goldsboro banking markets also troubled the dissenters. The
Statesville market had the merger's second highest raw increase in
HHI, 400 points.5  The HHI increase moved the Statesville market
from being reasonably competitive to being highly concentrated.'59
Consequently, the dissenters described the HHI increase as pushing
and exceeding the outer limits of what the Board should approve . 6
In the Goldsboro market, the proposal resulted in Southern National
controlling 35.6 percent of the market deposits and the HHI
increasing 248 points to 2295.161 The dissenters did not feel there
were any mitigating factors in the Goldsboro market. As in the
Statesville market, the dissenters concluded the Goldsboro market
exceeded the market concentration level to such an extent that the
Board should not have approved the merger application. 62
The most notable aspect of the Southern National opinion is
that it indicated that the entire Board was uncomfortable with the
growing number of mergers that exceeded Merger Guidelines in a
number of local markets. Governor Meyer used Southern National
to state his concerns over the state of bank mergers and the need for
more divestitures when there are few or no mitigating factors in a
local market that reduce the adverse effects on the market caused by
a merger. 63  Governor Meyer was consistent with this position
following the Commercial Bank & Trust Co. decision when he stated
the Board may require more divestitures in the future.' 64 Finally, the
Southern National dissent provided a basis for the pushing the
157. See id.
158. See id. at 599, 602. The HHI increased 500 points in the Fayetteville market as a
result of the merger. See id. at 600.
159. See id. at 602.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 599, 602.
162. See id. at 602.
163. See id.
164. See Federal Bank Regulator Threatens Strict Stance on Future Mergers, supra note
11, at F7.
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envelope language supported by the whole Board in its statements
following the recent NB-Barnett decision. 165
C. Recent NB-Barnett Decision
The statement the Board released after the decision in the
recent NB-Barnett proposal was the most solid evidence yet that in
the future the Board plans to review bank merger proposals with a
closer eye to post-merger market concentrations. Several factors
seem to have led to the Board's plan for a refocused emphasis on
post-merger market concentrations. The most notable factor is the
increased number of bank mergers testing the outer limits of the HHI
Merger Guidelines.'66 An additional factor is a Board that is
seemingly less tolerant of merger applications that substantially
exceed Merger Guidelines. 67 Whatever the reason, banking industry
attorneys need to take notice because the Board has sent a message
and its content is clear. Big deals like the ones highlighting the latter
half of 1997 are going to be subjected to closer scrutiny "when
market concentration guidelines are exceeded in a large number of
local markets."'68
The Board's statement indicated, however, that there would
not be a total break from bank merger review standards. The
decision did not change the HHI Merger Guidelines. 69 The federal
merger guidelines for a bank merger are still 1800/200.170 The
Board's statement also did not reflect a major change in the policy
stance of the Board concerning bank mergers. 7' What the statement
did highlight was the Board's plan to change the emphasis during the
review process, especially in proposals dealing with large mergers
that included transactions likely to affect numerous markets.17 2
165. See Southern Nat'l, 83 Fed. Res. Bull.. at 602; see also Bruce, supra note 14, at
904.
166. See Bruce, supra note 14, at 904.
167. See Banks May Have to Work Harder, supra note 16, at 904 (noting a change in the
composition of the Board).
168. Bruce, supra note 14, at 904.
169. See id. at 903.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id.
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Under the Board's new emphasis, it has indicated that in large
mergers (like the mega-mergers that grabbed the headlines toward
the end of 1997) where a significant number of markets are likely to
be adversely affected, the Board is going to focus more intently on
the possible effects of the merger in the non-complying markets.'73
The Board laid out what it considers important under its new
emphasis. First, in highly concentrated markets the Board will make
special note of the raw increase in the HHI. 74 Second, the Board
will pay close attention to the acquirer's market share resulting from
the merger.'75 Third, the Board will closely scrutinize the strength
and nature of the remaining competitors in the market.'76 Finally, the
Board has provided a catchall provision requiring it to consider "the
strength of additional positive and negative forces that may affect
competition for financial services in each market."' 77
This new emphasis really does not appear to change the
Board's focus because it has always considered these factors when
evaluating a merger proposal. However, there are several ways to
interpret the new emphasis. For example, it may have simply been
that the Board did not consider these factors as closely as thought in
the past. It also may be that the Board plans to scrutinize these
factors more closely than other factors in the future or it could be that
the Board has not really changed its position at all.
Although the full repercussions of the Board's statement
following the NB-Barnett decision are not readily apparent, it would
be risky and arguably foolish to ignore them. Industry attorneys
must strongly consider the statement in preparing for future
proposals before the Board. Attorneys and banks that are
contemplating a mega-merger where a large number of markets are
going to exceed the HHI Merger Guidelines should be prepared to
present numerous mitigating factors because the Board is going to
evaluate their applications through a magnifying lens.
Banks can do several things to improve their chances of
gaining the Board's approval under the new emphasis. Banks can
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. Id.
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make a stronger case for approval under the Board's new emphasis if
they try to minimize the raw increase in HHI and the acquirer's post-
merger market share.17' Arguing not only that there are numerous
competitors remaining in the market but also that the remaining
competitors are strong is also essential to gaining application
approval. 179 An additional way to gain the Board's approval is
through divestitures. Finally, if a bank is proposing an abnormally
offensive merger, it should use the catchall provision to point out
factors detracting from the merger's potential adverse effects on
market competition.'
Dissecting the cases approved and denied by the Board over
the last few years shows numerous mitigating factors that the Board
feels comfortable in using as evidence that merger proposals will not
adversely affect market competition, even though the proposals
substantially exceed the HI-I Merger Guidelines."' Banks should
evaluate these factors to understand the types of things the Board
looks for in a mitigating factor. Banks should also use these factors
as the bases for their arguments that their mergers do not adversely
affect market competition. Note, however, that while the Board has
created a substantial list of factors attorneys can use to create their
arguments, the Board "may not be as receptive to arguments that
questionable concentration levels are offset by other factors." '
The Board's recent statement and its new emphasis have not
dramatically changed preparation for future large mergers, and they
have not changed the Board's criteria concerning small and midsize
mergers when large numbers of markets are not affected.8 The new
emphasis simply places banks and their attorneys on notice of
specific areas the Board will be more closely scrutinizing if it feels
the merger proposal might be pushing the envelope. Finally, while
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See supra notes 54-135 and accompanying text.
182. Bank May Have to Work Harder, supra note 16, at 904.
183. See Bruce, supra note 14 at 903. The scrutiny mega-mergers will be placed under
probably will not be put on these small to medium-sized applications. Therefore, the
mitigating factors arguments made over the last two years should suffice to gain the Board's
approval for small and medium-sized merger proposals that exceed Merger Guidelines. See
supra notes 40-53 and accompanying text for the ways to circumvent HHI Merger
Guidelines.
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the Board may not have greatly changed the review process, it did
make it clear that this is a notice case, and it does not want to have to
give further notice by denying a merger proposal. 84 The Board has
also made it clear that it has seen the edges of the HHI Merger
Guidelines pushed for the last two years, and it doesn't like the
"creeping.""' If bank industry attorneys do not take notice, they
could be jeopardizing future proposals." 6
VI. CONCLUSION
Over the past two years, the Board has approved mergers
notwithstanding their failure to comply with the HHI Merger
Guidelines. Obviously, divestitures can solve market concentration
problems, but mitigating factors can be argued in conjunction with
divestitures or in the place of them with equal success. The
mitigating factors the Board has found most compelling (when
supported by the factual record) are the number of competitors
remaining in the market, the market's attractiveness for entry, and the
amount the post-merger HHI exceeds Merger Guidelines. Merger
applications seeking to consummate mergers in concentrated markets
should carefully consider the possible application of these mitigating
factors, or if they are not present, arrange for divestitures. The Board
seems to have signaled its concern over the large merger transactions
where there is significant post-merger market concentration in a
number of markets. The Board expressed this concern in Southern
National and in its statement following the recent NB-Barnett
decision. Although the NB-Barnett application was ultimately
approved, the Board indicated that it did not like the "creeping" and
in the future it was going to more closely scrutinize merger
applications for large mergers that exceeded Merger Guidelines in
numerous markets. Although the Board has indicated it will use
closer scrutiny in certain future proposals, it seems that, for the most
part, the HHI guidelines are not strictly adhered to and are not a true
impediment to merger proposal approval even when the proposal
184. See id. at 903.
185. Id. at 904.
186. See id.
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substantially exceeds Merger Guidelines for market concentration.
Unless the Board comes full circle in its view toward merger review,
in most cases the road seems clear for future mergers whether they
conform to merger guideline standards or not.
CHAD F. BROWN
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
APPENDIX A
Hybrid Proposals
POST-
MERGER AND
CASE NAME RAW MITIGATING FACTORS
INCREASE IN
HHI
Fleet Financial Group (Hartford) (Hartford)
(82 Fed. Res. Bull. 50) 1827/469 Number of competitors remaining
in the market, attractiveness of
market for entry, and increases in
amount of deposits and shares of
deposits by two depository
institutions as a result of the
divestitures.
(Old Saybrook) (Old Saybrook)
1904/298 Number of competitors remaining
in the market, thrift institutions in
the market capable of competing
with commercial banks, and unique
location of the market near three
Ranally Metropolitan Areas and
two central business districts.
Boatmen's BancShares (Muskogee) (Muskogee)
(82 Fed. Res. Bull. 167) 2279/236 Number of competitors remaining
in the market, attractiveness of
market for entry, and banks in the
market that are generally more
profitable than other similarly
situated banks in the state.
U.S. Bancorp (Portland) (Portland)
(82 Fed. Res. Bull. 177) 2226/230 Reduction in number and
percentage of market deposits
because of divestitures, number of
competitors in market stayed the
same after the merger, and
attractiveness of market for entry.
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POST-
MERGER AND
CASE NAME RAW MITIGATING FACTORS
INCREASE IN
HHI
CoreStates Financial (Berks Co.) (Berks Co.)
Corp. 2304/200 Number of competitors remaining
(82 Fed. Res. Bull. 430) in the market and high household
income compared to other markets
in the state.
River Valley Bancorp (Madison) (Madison)
(82 Fed. Res. Bull. 2608/329 Number of competitors remaining
1136) in the market and increase in market
competitiveness in recent years.
Southern Nat'l Corp.
(83 Fed. Res. Bull. 596)
(Columbus Co.)
4493/277
(Goldsboro)
2295/248
(Sanford)
2195/296
(Moore Co.)
1988/330
(Columbus Co.)
Small increase in market control by
largest competitor, divestitures
allowed a large new market
competitor to replace Southern
National as the second largest
market competitor, number of
competitors remaining in the
market, and the intention of two
new competitors to enter the
market.
(Goldsboro)
Number of competitors remaining
in the market, attractiveness of
market for entry, and increased
amount of market deposits
controlled by two smaller market
competitors as a result of
divestitures.
(Sanford)
Number of competitors remaining
in the market and attractiveness of
market for entry.
(Moore Co.)
Number of competitors remaining
in the market and attractiveness of
market for entry.
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POST-
MERGER AND
CASE NAME RAW MITIGATING FACTORS
INCREASE IN
HHI
Southern Nat'l Corp. (Pitt Co.) (Pitt Co.)
(83 Fed. Res. Bull. 596) 1886/325 Number of competitors remaining
in the market, attractiveness of
market for entry, and the presence
of a thrift institution in the market
that fully competed with
commercial banks in the market.
(Statesville) (Statesville)
2265/400 Number of competitors remaining
in the market, attractiveness of
market for entry, and a decrease in
market HHI in years prior to the
merger.
(Fayetteville) (Fayetteville)
2019/500 Number of competitors remaining
in the market and attractiveness of
market for entry.
Mercantile (Pettis Co.) (Pettis Co.)
Bancorporation 2522/223 Number of competitors remaining
(83 Fed. Res. Bull 683) in the market and attractiveness of
market for entry.
(Phelps Co.) (Phelps Co.)
2234/204 Number of competitors remaining
in the market and attractiveness of
market for entry.
Associated Banc-Corp (Manitowoc-Two (Manitowoc-Two Rivers)
(83 Fed. Res. Bull. 910) Rivers) Number of competitors remaining
2144/305 in the market, attractiveness of
market for entry, and low legal
barriers to entry.
Union Planters Corp. (Washington Co.) (Washington Co.)
(83 Fed. Res. Bull. 928) 2053/280 Number of competitors remaining
in the market and rural nature of the
market.
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POST-
MERGER AND
CASE NAME RAW MITIGATING FACTORS
INCREASE IN
HHI
Wachovia Corp. (Charlottesville) (Charlottesville)
(83 Fed. Res. Bull. 2237/277 Number of competitors remaining
1020) in the market, attractiveness of
market for entry and other factors
occurring due to divestitures.
NB-Boatmen's (El Paso) (El Paso)
(83 Fed. Res. Bull. 148) 2199/222 Number of competitors remaining
in the market and attractiveness of
market for entry.
NB-Barnett
(84 Fed. Res. Bull. 129)
(Naples)
1839/548
(Orlando)
2063/445
(Polk Co.)
1906/383
(Punta Gorda)
2131/400
(Tallahassee)
1815/254
(Ocala)
2067/503
(Naples)
Number of competitors remaining
in the market, attractiveness of
market for entry, and two banks
announced plans to enter market.
(Orlando)
Number of competitors remaining
in the market and attractiveness of
market for entry.
(Polk Co.)
Number of competitors remaining
in the market and attractiveness of
market for entry.
(Punta Gorda)
Number of competitors remaining
in the market and attractiveness of
market for entry.
(Tallahassee)
Number of competitors remaining
in the market and attractiveness of
market for entry.
(Ocala)
Number of competitors remaining
in the market, attractiveness of
market for entry, and market
divestitures would add a competitor
or make a market competitor more
competitive.
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POST-
CASE NAME MERGER AND MITIGATING FACTORS
RAW
INCREASE IN
____ __ ___ HHI
NB-Barnett
(84 Fed. Res. Bull. 129)
(Fort Myers)
2035/377
(Daytona Beach)
2121/368
(Tampa Bay)
1918/467
(Brevard)
1962/342
(Sarasota)
1808/380
(Brunswick Co.)
2025/421
(Fort Myers)
Number of competitors remaining
in the market, attractiveness of
market for entry, and the number of
market competitors would remain
the same and an effective new
competitor would enter the market
as a result of divestitures.
(Daytona Beach)
Number of competitors remaining
in the market and attractiveness of
market for entry.
(Tampa Bay)
Number of competitors remaining
in the market and attractiveness of
market for entry.
(Brevard)
Number of competitors remaining
in the market, attractiveness of
market for entry, and divestitures
strengthen a local competitors
market position.
(Sarasota)
Number of competitors remaining
in the market and attractiveness of
market for entry.
(Brunswick Co.)
Number of competitors remaining
in the market, attractiveness of
market for entry, and a new
effective market competitor as a
result of divestitures.
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APPENDIX B
Solely Mitigating Factors Proposals
POST-
MERGER AND
CASE NAME RAW MITIGATING FACTORS
INCREASE IN
HHI
Norwest Corp. (Canton) (Canton)
(82 Fed. Res.Bull.156) 2066/201 Number of competitors remaining in
the market, state's largest credit
union competed in the market, and
Merger Guidelines only exceeded
by a small amount.
First Bank System (Lincoln) (Lincoln)
(82 Fed. Res. Bull. 169) 2207/222 Number of competitors remaining in
the market, attractiveness of market
for entry, and Merger Guidelines
only exceeded by a small amount.
Aspen Bancshares (Cortez) (Cortez)
(82 Fed. Res. Bull. 665) 2367/657 The merging banks consisted of a
thrift institution that focused
primarily on mortgage lending and a
commercial bank that focused
primarily on commercial lending,
number of competitors remaining in
the market, attractiveness of market
for entry, and low legal barriers to
market entry.
Community Bancshares (Marshall- (Marshall-Washington Co.)
(82 Fed. Res. Bull. 735) Washington Co.) Number of competitors remaining in
1848/347 the market, market location, and low
legal barriers to market entry.
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POST-
MERGER AND
CASE NAME RAW MITIGATING FACTORS
INCREASE IN
HHI
Banco Santander, S.A. (San Juan) (San Juan)
(82 Fed. Res. Bull. 833) 1896/231 Number of competitors remaining in
the market and the ability of the
market to meet Merger Guidelines
when recalculated to include savings
and credit union cooperatives.
(Aguadilla) (Aguadilla)
3001/253 Number of competitors remaining in
the market and the ability of the
market to meet Merger Guidelines
when recalculated to include
savings, and credit union
cooperatives.
First Southem Bancorp (Danville) (Danville)
(82 Fed. Res. Bull. 854) 1914/272 Number of competitors remaining in
the market (with specific mention of
the nature of the remaining
competitors).
First Merchants Corp. (Muncie) (Muncie)
(82 Fed. Res. Bull. 942) 2184/281 Number of competitors remaining in
the market and attractiveness of
market for entry.
InterWest Bancorp (Omak- (Omak-Okanogan)
(82 Fed. Res. Bull. 944) Okanogan) Number of competitors remaining in
1875/397 the market and the ability of the
market to meet Merger Guidelines
when calculated using only
individual, partnership, and
corporation deposits.
(Chelan) (Chelan)
2981/211 Number of competitors remaining in
the market, attractiveness of market
for entry, and low legal barriers to
market entry.
Nacogdoches (Nacogdoches) (Nacogdoches)
Commercial Bancshares 2409/259 Number of competitors remaining in
(82 Fed. Res. Bull. the market and attractiveness of
1121) market for entry.
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POST-
MERGER AND
CASE NAME RAW MITIGATING FACTORS
INCREASE IN
First Union Corp. (Highlands Co.) (Highlands Co.)
(82 Fed. Res. Bull. 2273/238 Number of competitors remaining in
1123) the market and attractiveness of
market for entry.
Shoreline Financial (Benton Harbor- (Benton Harbor-St. Joseph)
Corp. St. Joseph) Number of competitors remaining in
(83 Fed. Res. Bull. 515) 2348/376 the market, attractiveness of market
for entry, low legal barriers to entry,
and large credit unions in the
market.
G.B. Financial Services (Roseau) (Roseau)
(83 Fed. Res. Bull. 509) 3769/414 Basically the same individuals
controlled the merging banks before
after the merger and a long history
of affiliation between the banks and
their shareholders.
NB-First Nat'l (Scott Co.) (Scott Co.)
(83 Fed. Res. Bull. 593) 5141/844 More than seventy-two percent of
the voting shares controlled by
NationsBank were under the
principle control of shareholders of
another bank.
(Worcester Co.) (Worcester Co.)
2045/299 Number of competitors remaining in
the market.
Exchange Bancshares (Atchison Co.) (Atchison Co.)
Corp. 2098/462 Number of competitors remaining in
(83 Fed. Res. Bull. 671) a largely rural market and the fact
that a substantial portion of one of
the bank's business was conducted
with military personnel living
outside the market.
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Banco Popular de Puerto (San Juan) (San Juan)
Rico 1950/203 Number of competitors remaining in
(83 Fed. Res. Bull. 612) the market and the ability of the
market to meet Merger Guidelines
when recalculated to include savings
and credit union cooperatives.
Barnett Banks (Punta Gorda) (Punta Gorda)
(83 Fed. Res. Bull. 916) 2143/653 Number of competitors remaining in
the market and attractiveness of
market for entry.
(De Soto) (De Soto)
3241/299 Number of competitors remaining in
the market and attractiveness of
market for entry.
Citizens Commercial (Celina-St. (Celina-St. Mary's)
(83 Fed. Res. Bull. 933) Mary's) Number of competitors remaining in
1908/645 the market, the intention of two
competitors to open new branches in
the market in the near future, and
the small rural nature of the market.
First Natl Sec. Co. (McCurtain Co.) (McCurtain Co.)
(84 Fed. Res. Bull. 58) 1971/285 Number of Competitors remaining
in the market and small rural nature
of the market.
First of Waverly Corp. (Bremer Co.) (Bremer Co.)
(84 Fed. Res. Bull. 111) 1850/294 Number of competitors remaining in
the market, rural nature of the
market, recent de novo entry into
the market, and the small change in
market concentration.
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APPENDIX C
ANALYSIS OF THE TWO DENIED PROPOSALS
First State Bancshares
82 Fed. Res. Bull. 953
In August 1996, the Board denied the acquisition by First
State Bancshares of Blakely, Inc. (First State) of First Southwest
Bancorp, Inc. and its wholly owned thrift subsidiary, First Federal
Savings Bank of Southwest Georgia (FFSB).8 7 The Board denied
the acquisition of the thrift holding company after deciding the
merger would have adverse effects on competition in the Early
County, Georgia banking market."'8
The Early County banking market only had three depository
institutions prior to the proposed merger.8 9 Of the three competitors,
First State was the largest and FFSB was the smallest. 90 First State
would have represented market deposits exceeding sixty-six percent
and controlled $71.9 million in total deposits if the proposal had been
approved. 9' First State would also have only had to compete with
one other depository institution if the merger had been allowed.'
The proposed merger would have caused the HI to increase by
1208 points to 5549.193
First State cited several factors it felt mitigated the potential
adverse effects on competition posed by the merger. However, the
Board did not find these mitigating factors persuasive. In addition to
the adverse competitive consideration discussed below, the Board
also considered the public benefit of the proposed merger, and
concluded the public benefit did not outweigh the detriment of
reduced competition and reduced services.'94 The Board had no
trouble later approving this same proposal after First State agreed to
187. See First State Bancshares, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 953 (1996).
188. See id.
189. See id. at 955.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 956.
192. See id. at 955.
193. Seeid.
194. See id. at 957.
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divest FFSB.'95 The chart below lists the arguments made by First
State Bancshares and why the Board denied them.
First State Bancshares
Arguments Made by First State for Reasons Arguments Rejected by the
Merger Approval Board
(1) First State and FFSB did not The Board agreed that First State and
provide the same products and FFSB did not compete for the same
services as FFSB. products; however, the Board noted that
they did compete in four of the same loan
product lines. The Board concluded these
four lines: commercial and industrial
loans, agricultural loans, 1-to-4 family
mortgage loans, and consumer loans,
were all important to the citizens of Early
County and weighed heavily in
demonstrating that First State and FFSB
did in fact directly compete for the same
business.
(2) Nonbanking competitors in the The Board found the presence of
Early County market demonstrated nonbanking competitors did not mitigate
that the effects of the merger were the adverse effects of the proposal for
overstated by the HHI several reasons. First, the largest
nonbank competitor in the market had
membership requirements that would
have precluded fifty percent of the
market citizens from joining. Second,
even if the largest nonbank competitor
had been included at one hundred
percent, the HHI would have still
increased 1205 points to 4182, Third,
nearly eighty-five percent, of Early
County residents obtained their banking
services and products from the markets
three depository institutions.
195. See First State Bancshares, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 46 (1997).
[V"ol. 2386
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BancSecurity Corporation
83 Fed. Res. Bull. 122
In December of 1996, the Board denied BancSecurity
Corporation's (BaneSecurity) proposal to acquire Marshalltown
Financial Corporation (MFC) and MFC's wholly owned thrift
subsidiary, Marshalltown Savings Bank (Marshalltown Savings).'96
The Board, after considering, the entire record and all relevant
factors, concluded the merger would have adverse effects on
competition in the Marshall County banking market.' 97
The Marshall County market would have dramatically
changed had the merger been approved. BancSecurity would have
196. See BancSecurity Corp., 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 122 (1996).
197. See id.
Arguments Made by First State for Reasons Arguments Rejected by the
Merger Approval Board
(3) The Early County economy could The Board found First State's claim
not support three depository unfounded for several reasons. First,
institutions Early County had experienced growth in
population and per capita income in the
years prior to the proposed merger.
Federal Reserve Surveys indicated that
this growth should continue in the near
future. Second, the three depository
institutions had performed relatively
well compared to other non-MSA
counties in the state. Third, the
contention that FFSB had been
performing poorly was unfounded.
FFSB earned a profit in 1993 and had
no sign of a long-term downward trend
in profits. FFSB had also experienced a
steady growth in deposits over its
twenty-year life.
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remained the largest depository institution in the market. 9 It would
have controlled $301 million in deposits and represented just less
than fifty percent of market deposits.'99 The merger would have
caused the HHI to increase by 849 points to 3032, substantially
exceeding Merger Guidelines."' The Board discounted four possible
mitigating factors that might reduce the merger's adverse effects on
competition.
BancSecurity Corp.
Arguments Made by Reasons Arguments Rejected by the
BancSecurity for Merger Board
Approval
(1) Thirteen depository institutions The Board concluded that the disparity
would remain in the market after between the market deposits controlled by
the merger. BancSecurity and the remaining depository
institutions diminished any mitigating value
the number of competitors remaining in the
market might have. BancSecurity would
have controlled ten times more market
deposits than all but two of the remaining
competitors would. Also, of
BancSecurity's twelve remaining
competitors, nine would have controlled
less than three percent of market deposits
and one other would have controlled less
than five percent. This disparity would have
allowed BancSecurity to maintain an
undesirable dominant position in the
Marshall County market.
198. See id. at 124.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 125. The Board discussed the merger's possible effects on competition in
the different product areas where Security Bank and Savings compete before discounting
the mitigating factors proposed by BancSecurity. In the area of mortgage loans, the merger
would have caused the HHI to increase by 1758 points to 3953 and would have given
BancSecurity control of 60% of the mortgage loan market. See id. In the product area of
federally insured deposit accounts, the merger would have caused the HHI to increase 961
points to 2933 and would have given BancSecurity control of 48% of the market. See id.
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Arguments Made by Reasons Arguments Rejected by the
BancSecurity for Merger Board
Approval
(2) Several large banks would The Board discounted the presence of
compete in the market after the other large banks competing in the market
merger. as a mitigating factor. The Board noted
that there had been no serious
encroachment on BancSecurity's share of
market deposits in the five years prior to
the proposed merger. According to a
survey by the staff of the Board and the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,
BancSecurity also controlled every
lending category in the market. Finally,
the Board noted that BancSecurity had
maintained this dominant position despite
five banks entering the Marshall County
market since 1994.
(3) Market was attractive for entry. The Board found that the legal barriers
imposed by Iowa law for new entrants into
the market outweighed the market's
attractiveness for entry. At the time of the
proposed merger, Iowa law strictly limited
interstate banking and allowed very
limited out-of-state banking expansion.
Since entry into the banking market was
extremely difficult under Iowa law, the
Board stated that the market's
attractiveness for entry was all but
eliminated.
(4) Influence by credit unions both The Board stated that the influence on
inside and outside of the market. competition by credit unions both inside
and outside the market was minimal.
Combined, the four credit unions in the
Marshall County market controlled less
than seven percent of market deposits.
Three of the four credit unions had strict
membership requirements. In addition,
even if the credit union, without
membership requirements, was included in
the HHI calculation, the HHI would have
increased 818 points to 2903, substantially
exceeding Merger Guidelines.
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